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This thesis examines one of the U.S. Navy's major capability initiatives aimed at 
addressing the changed strategic and technological environment since the end of the 
Cold War. This initiative is known as the Arsenal Ship. This thesis considers 
operational concepts for use of the Arsenal Ship; it examines some of the cost and 
technical issues that have been raised, and it reviews possible alternatives. 
The thesis concludes that the Arsenal Ship is a viable platform for meeting the 
U.S. Navy's requirement for littoral power projection to meet the strategic and 
technological requirements of the 21st century. While there are limitations to the 
Arsenal Ship, the program is conceptually sound and the Arsenal Ship demonstrator 
program should be pursued. 
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This thesis examines one of the U.S. Navy's major capability initiatives aimed at 
addressing the changed strategic and technological environment since the end of the Cold 
War. This initiative is known as the Arsenal Ship. This thesis considers operational 
concepts for use of the Arsenal Ship; it examines some of the cost and technical issues that 
have been raised, and it reviews possible alternatives. 
This thesis addresses these questions in seven chapters. Chapter I is the 
introduction. Chapter II discusses the fundamental changes in U.S. naval strategy 
following the end of the Cold War. It points out that the Navy's basic preoccupation with 
security on the high seas has shifted toward a strategy of joint operations conducted from 
the sea. Basic national guidance for planning and programming Navy operations from the 
sea is premised on the requirement that U.S. military forces be able to fight and win two 
near-simultaneous major regional conflicts (MRCs). 
Chapter III discusses the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). It 
specifically focuses on what some military planners believe will be a vastly enhanced U.S. 
capability to engage in "precision warfare." The chapter addresses innovative technologies 
which the Navy can capitalize on in attempts to maintain its dominant international 
position. 
Chapter IV ties together the discussions in Chapters II and III. It argues that the 
strategic changes in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, when combined with 
impending technological changes, amount to a revolution in naval affairs. It goes on to 
xi 
examine elements required to provide a link between the current Navy and the Navy 
intended for the 21st century. 
Chapter V discusses the concept of the Arsenal Ship, including principal features 
such as a planned 500-cell Vertical Launch System, substantial automation, greatly 
reduced crew requirements, and the incorporation of the Cooperative Engagement 
Capability. This chapter also addresses costs, survivability concerns and options proposed 
in lieu of the Arsenal Ship. 
Chapter VI discusses some of the operational applications and deployment 
concepts of the Arsenal Ship. It is concerned in particular with how this capability may be 
fully integrated into a new Navy capability to directly and operationally affect the conduct 
of war on land. 
The Arsenal Ship has its share of proponents and detractors. Supporters believe 
that the ship is critical to the Navy's requirement to meet the demands ofboth a littoral 
strategy and the current rate of technological progress. Opponents argue that it is 
imprudent to invest time and money in a new platform during an era of reduced global 
threat and while existing platforms are capable of meeting current and anticipated security 
requirements. This thesis concludes that, on balance, the Arsenal Ship meets the Navy's 
requirement for a platform capable of executing a naval power projection strategy in the 
21st century. The Arsenal Ship may not be the perfect ship- important questions still 
remain. However, given the lengthy period oftime associated with the development of 
new weapons systems, timely alternatives appear unlikely. 
Xll 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The variety and design of ships in the Navy have been subject to very few large scale 
changes during the past 45 years. When they have occurred, they were typically the 
result of technological developments, new operational concepts or a combination of both. 
The result was commonly an incremental improvement upon existing ship designs. As 
the 21st century looms on the horizon, U.S. strategy is changing while technological 
innovation accelerates. The combination of these events raises the question whether or 
not improvements to existing ships will suffice for the future Navy or if there is a need 
for an entirely new type of platform. 
The Navy has evidently decided upon the latter. On 18 March, 1995 the Navy signed 
an agreement with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) which 
formalized a cooperative effort toward the research and development of a radically 
different seagoing platform termed the "Arsenal Ship." The platform, when completed, 
will be vastly different from anything the Navy has in its inventory. 
The Arsenal Ship is conceptually designed to carry a substantially higher ordnance 
payload than any current ship in the fleet. It is intended to provide massive firepower in 
the initial stages of a conflict while operating under an integrated C41 (command, control, 
communications, computers and intelligence) system consistent with the joint focus of 
the 21st century U.S. military. 
1 
This thesis addresses the strategic and technological changes that will have an impact 
on the future of the Navy. Initially, the work addresses the fundamental changes which 
have occurred in U.S. strategic thinking following the end of the Cold War. Chapter II 
analyzes those changes and the factors which have influenced them. Additionally, it 
examines the increasing emphasis placed on joint strategy in order to assess recent 
changes and determine whether or not those changes provide a catalyst for revolutionary 
measures associated with new platform designs. 
Chapter III addresses the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA.) It reviews 
emerging innovative technologies and their potential impact on the way U.S. forces will 
operate in peacetime and, when required, during combat. 
Chapter IV addresses the combined impact of strategic and technological change 
which, this thesis proposes, has set the stage for a naval revolution. The chapter focuses 
on one dimension of this revolution in particular, i.e. the concept of "precision strike." 
This concept is central to the Arsenal Ship. The Arsenal Ship, when mated with precision 
strike capabilities and innovative operational strategies, has the potential of changing the 
Navy's institutional make-up in a manner as dramatic and far-reaching as occurred with 
the creation of nuclear-powered submarines, the emergence of the aircraft carrier as the 
capital ship, and the development of amphibious warfare techniques during in World War 
II. 
Chapter V considers the Arsenal Ship's principal features. It also addresses the main 
2 
concerns that have been raised as well as some of the alternatives which have been 
proposed. 
In previous eras revolutions have resulted in institutional changes for the Navy. The 
transition of the Navy from a service identified with the battleship to one identified with 
the aircraft carrier was significant and had a far-reaching organizational and professional 
impact throughout the service. 1 Fifty years later the possibility of such a change 
occurring again has arisen with the concept of the Arsenal Ship. Chapter VI analyzes the 
operational potential of the Arsenal Ship in the current geopolitical and security 
environment. It assesses whether or not the Arsenal Ship might be an appropriate choice 
for the Navy for the next 25 years. 
In summary, this thesis assesses strategic and technical issues which will potentially 
effect the future security environment in which the Navy will be operating. The primary 
question of this thesis is whether or not changes associated with the shift in the Navy's 
strategic focus have created a gap in current U.S. naval ship capabilities. If so, the next 
question is whether there is a need for a new ship within the Navy and whether the 
proposed Arsenal ship is the appropriate solution. 
1 References include: Richard Hough, Death of the Battleship, (New York: The 
MacMillan Company, 1963) and Clark G. Reynolds, The Fast Carriers: The Forging of 
An Air Navy, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968). 
3 
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II. THE STRATEGIC REVOLUTION 
A. LITTORAL FOCUS 
Recent changes in strategic direction and doctrine ofU.S. naval forces have shifted 
the focus of naval roles and missions in such a dramatic fashion that some might view 
them as revolutionary. One of the questions this thesis attempts to answer is whether, as 
a result of revolutionary changes in U.S. naval strategy, an innovative new ship concept is 
necessary or appropriate for the strategic environment facing the U.S. military in the 21st 
century. 
During the five years or so preceding the collapse of the Berlin Wall, Department of 
the Navy strategic thinking was exemplified by the Maritime Strategy.2 This strategic 
concept focused on the use ofNavy and Marine Corps forces in a global war with the 
Soviet Union. Specifically, the Maritime Strategy was centered around the concept of 
"blue water" or open-ocean naval warfare against a powerful Soviet surface, submarine 
2 Admiral James D. Watkins and General P.X. Kelley, "The Maritime Strategy" and 
"Amphibious Warfare Strategy", as published in U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 112, no. 
1 (January, 1986): 2-29. This was the official statement of policy during the 1980's for U.S. 
naval forces, combined with other U.S. services and allied forces, on how preparations would 
be made for fighting and terminating war on favorable terms. (henceforth cited as the 
Maritime Strategy.) 
5 
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and air fleet. 3 
The end ofthe Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Union, spelled the demise of the 
Maritime Strategy. As a result, the Navy announced a "fundamental shift away from 
open-ocean warfighting on the sea toward joint operations conducted from the sea."4 This 
shift served to re-focus U.S. naval capabilities on the need for joint and combined 
operations, forward presence and power projection, strategic deterrence, on-scene crisis 
response; and sea-lift.5 Collectively, these and related missions are expected to be carried 
out primarily in littoral waters adjacent to the land mass. 
From the Sea and Forward ... From the Sea are not the sole sources for this 
"fundamental shift." The need for U.S. naval forces to be able to influence events on land 
was highlighted in the results of the Department ofDefense Bottom-Up Review (BUR).6 
This document, signed by then - Defense Secretary Les Aspin and published in 1993, 
announced the restructuring ofU.S. military forces to cope with the new dangers of the 
post-Cold War era, specifically aggression by regional powers requiring that U.S. forces 
3 Ibid. 
4 Department of the Navy, From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st 
Centm:y, (henceforth noted as ... From the Sea), (Washington, D.C.: September 1992), 3. 
This document is the foundation for the U.S. Navy's strategy and doctrinal shift from 
planning associated with war at sea toward joint operations on land supported by naval 
forces "from the sea". The strategic concept was expanded in the 1994 publication of 
Forward ... From the Sea, (Washington, D.C.: Undated). 
5 Ibid, 2. 
6 Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, Report on the Bottom-Up Review, (henceforth cited as 
BUR), (Washington, D.C.: October 1993). 
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henceforth be designed to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts 
(MRCs).7 
The BUR's two-MRC scenario posed a formidable doctrinal challenge for the Navy. 
The BUR made clear that the principal adversaries likely to be encountered would be 
land-based, and their forces would be predominantly comprised of tanks, armored 
personnel carriers, land-based aircraft and ballistic missiles, etc. 8 The question before 
Navy strategists was how the service, whose capabilities and operational concepts had 
historically been focused on engagement on the high seas, could best ensure its 
operational relevance against a land-based adversary. 
According to the BUR, the U.S. response to a major regional conflict would entail 
four main phases: (1) halt the enemy invasion, (2) build up U.S. combat power, (3) 
decisively defeat the enemy, and (4) provide for post-war stability.9 The ability of U.S. 
forces to halt an enemy assault quickly and before the opponent reached key strategic 
objectives was believed central to U.S. success. Concentrated firepower early in the 
conflict was believed to hold the key to this success. 10 The Arsenal Ship appears to be the 
Navy's solution. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid, 13. 
9 Ibid, 15 - 16 . 
10 Ibid, 15. 
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B. JOINT WARFARE 
The strategic necessity for naval forces to re-direct their capabilities and operational 
concepts away from open-ocean warfighting toward operations on and over land, has re-
enforced the necessity for joint operations with land-based Army and Air Forces. The 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffs vision of how American military forces are to 
fight and win their next "joint" war, was articulated in a document entitled Joint Vision 
2010. 
1. Joint Focus on Strategy 
Joint Vision 2010 provides a template for the evolution of the U.S. Armed Forces into 
the next century. 11 Four broad operational concepts are highlighted in Joint Vision 2010: 
(1) dominant maneuver, (2) precision engagement, (3) focused logistics, and ( 4) full-
dimensional protection. Collectively, they define "full-spectrum dominance." Its 
spearhead in a MRC will be the Navy. Joint Vision 2010 indicates naval forces will 
substantially contribute to the initial means by which joint operations will commence in 
the event of a crisis. Forward deployed naval expeditionary forces are extremely mobile 
11 General John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2010, 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, as published in Joint Force Quarterly, 
Summer 1996), 38. References for policy on joint activities include: Joint Warfare of the 
U.S. Armed Forces Joint Pub 1, (11 November 1991), and Unified Action Armed Forces. 
Joint Pub 0-2, (24 February 1995). 
8 
on global sea lanes. They are largely free from foreign basing and overflight constraints 
that can hinder land-based forces. Additionally, they can be assembled out of range of 
enemy forces, yet ready for action in the event a decision is made to commit forces. If 
the political-military situation changes, they can be withdrawn without entanglement 
ashore. 12 
It appears that the Navy is striving to re-invent itself in concert with the changing 
international security environment so as to ensure its decisive contribution to future 
operations. The change from the Maritime Strategy to littoral warfare necessitates a 
reassessment of the structure of the fleet. Changes are discussed further in Chapter IV. 
12 Office of the Chief ofNaval Operations, Naval Operational Concept, (draft copy dated 
14 June 1996), 4. 
9 
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III. REVOLUTIONINMILITARY AFFAIRS 
As described in the document Joint Vision 2010, "full-spectrum dominance" is 
essentially the concept of dominating the full range of military operations from 
humanitarian assistance to full-fledged combat through a synergistic utilization of 
dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full dimensional protection, and focused 
logistics. In order for U.S. forces to ensure the capability to achieve this goal, they must 
modernize. According to Andrew Krepinevich, "a military whose modernization can be 
sustained over the long term is in the best position to contribute to an overall national 
security strategy designed to dissuade would-be proliferators and great power challengers, 
while maintaining sufficient capability for the regional rogue states and peace operations 
that confront it in the near term." 13 
Modernization of the U.S. military will most likely take advantage of what many 
commentators believe is an impending RMA. The latter has been variously defined, but a 
most useful description has been offered by Dan Goure'. He explained the RMA as 
"complex changes in military organization, operations, and capabilities that are linked to 
13 
"The Coming Defense Train Wreck and What to Do About It," The Washington 
Quarterly, (Winter 1996), 107. Comments made by Andrew F. K.repinevich who is the 
Director of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment, formerly known as the 
Defense Budget Project. 
11 
new technologies with greatly advanced capabilities." 14 
A. CONCEPTS OF THE RMA 
As the idea of an RMA has gained increased acceptance, it is essential to 
understand the concept. An RMA is commonly triggered by new technologies which 
lead to new military equipment that, in turn, prompt changes in operational concepts, as 
well as doctrine and organization. 15 As a result, the conduct of war is fundamentally 
altered. Two leading interpreters of the contemporary RMA, Andrew Krepinevich and 
Andrew Marshall, have explained the process as follows: RMAs, claims Krepinevich, 
... often are stimulated by significant changes in technology that 
facilitate a discontinuous leap in military effectiveness over a relatively 
short period of time, as occurred, for example, between the world wars. 
They are typically characterized by the rise of new military organizations 
which are created to fill new roles and to execute new missions. 16 
14 Dan Goure, "Is There a Military-Technical Revolution in America's Future?," The 
Washington Quarterly, (Autumn 1993), 16, no. 4, 179. 
15 James R. Fitzsimonds and Jan M. VanTol, "Revolutions in Military Affairs", Joint Forces 
Quarterly, (Spring 1994), 25-26. 
16 Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., The Military Revolution: Restructuring Defense for the 21st 
Century, Testimony Presented to The Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Acquisition 
and Technology, (5 May 1995), 2. 
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Marshall has offered this clarification: 
.. .innovations in technology make a military revolution possible, 
but the revolution itself takes place only when new concepts of operation 
develop and, in many cases, new military organizations are created. 17 
1. Components of the RMA 
The currently proposed RMA is characterized by stealth, global mobility, long-
range precision strike, information warfare, and the effective use of space. 18 It embodies 
the idea of a change in warfare that is so drastic, the results completely alter the way 
future wars will be fought. Historical examples include the aircraft which gave 
commanders a view of the entire battlefield and spawned aerial bombing; the submarine 
which presented a hidden and deadly threat to surface ships; and nuclear weapons which 
brought massive indiscriminate destructive capability to warfare. Each changed the way 
in which war was to be prepared for and fought. 
What are the components of a new RMA in the next century? According to 
Martin Libicki, "the twin roots of the RMA emerged in the late 1970's. First came the 
17 Andrew W. Marshall, Testimony Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee 
on Acquisition and Technology, (5 May 1995), 1. 
18 Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., "Keeping Pace with the Military-Technological Revolution," 
Issues in Science and Technology, (Summer 1994), 24. 
13 
development and proliferation of short-range precision-guided munitions (PGMs)." 19 
The second root of the RMA, writes Libicld, is the "rapid and sustained improvements in 
information technology. "20 
With improvements in weapons technology long-range PGMs increasingly appear 
to be the weapon of choice for future strike operations.21 The development of computers, 
satellites, and imagery has been occurring at an astounding rate, and there is no indication 
this will slow down in the foreseeable future. The inference is that the U.S. military will 
expand the ability to collect, evaluate and disseminate information relevant to the 
battlefield at a rate far greater than most current military opponents are capable of 
countering. 
The key to the RMA then appears to be precision warfare. Precision warfare is 
the utilization of information technology in determining essential targets, combined with 
PGMs tasked to strike those targets. Precision warfare should increase the target kill rate 
while reducing the number of munitions and platforms necessary to achieve an 
19 
"The Coming Defense Train Wreck and What to Do About It," 110. Comments by Martin 
Libicki. 
20 Libicki, "The Coming Defense Train Wreck. .. ," 110. 
21 Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., "A New Navy for a New Era," (Washington D.C.: Center For 
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, May 1996), i. 
14 
operation's goaF2 According to Libicld, future precision strike capabilities will mean 
that, "to be seen on the battlefield is to be killed. "23 The life span of equipment currently 
in inventory is rapidly decreasing. It therefore seems that many of the principal weapons 
systems ofthe next quarter century will likely be designed and built around the turn of 
the century. 24 
Acknowledging the rapid change in military affairs is crucial in order to assimilate 
the capabilities required of weapons or platforms that will contribute to winning a war in 
twenty-five years. Coupled with this is the critical need for ensuring the development of 
concepts of operations that incorporate the new technologies, and of organizations to 
permit effective exploitation of the new capabilities.25 
B. TECHNICAL REVOLUTION 
1. Information and Communications Warfare 
22 Captain Edward A. Smith, Jr., a senior member of the CNO's Executive Panel, this 
information was gathered during an interview conducted 20 May 1996. 
23 Libicki, "The Coming Defense Train Wreck. .. ," 110. 
24 Fitzsimonds, "Revolutions in Military Affairs", 28. 
25 Ibid, 29. 
15 
A most prominent aspect of the RMA is the revolution in information technology. 
Increasing focus is being paid to the development of technologies which enhance the 
ability to locate, identify, and track targets in greater numbers as well as over an extended 
period of time. Innovation associated with satellites and fixed platforms is rapidly 
improving these efforts. Future advances in sensor technology may open up unused 
portions of the electromagnetic spectrum that, when matched with improved 
computational capabilities and deployment in space, offer the prospect for a truly 
transparent battlefield. Meanwhile, improvements in the area of electronic systems and 
propulsion systems may be redesigned in a manner which will make platforms virtually 
undetectable.26 
Future battlefields may be dominated by a struggle for "information superiority." 
Much, if not most, information gathering, transmission and dissemination will be done 
automatically, without human interference. 
Such automation, though necessary, also creates new vulnerabilities. The most 
obvious is that associated with effective electronic countermeasures. It has been and will 
remain a primary military goal to render the opponent deaf, dumb and blind. Therefore, 
while the U.S. strives to improve its information and communication components, it must 
remain alert to associated vulnerabilities and strive to overcome them. 
26 Goure', "Is There as Military-Technical Revolution in America's Future?," 180. 
16 
2. Weapons Systems and Platforms 
Information warfare will probably be a central focus of future wars. But it alone 
cannot deter or win wars. Essential elements which must be present to exploit the 
benefits of information warfare are appropriate and sufficient weapons and platforms, i.e. 
precision strike weapons and launch platforms. Long-range precision strike weapons 
mated with stealthy platforms will allow mission accomplishment while minimizing 
platform vulnerability to enemy countermeasures. The best known examples are the U.S. 
Air Force's F-117A and B-2. 
3. Cooperative Engagement Capability 
Another component of the RMA is the Navy's concept known as the Cooperative 
Engagement Capability (CEC). It entails a concept for the control of naval combat forces 
that "fuzes sensor data from multiple platforms into coherent, so-called composite tracks 
of fire control quality, effectively transforming a naval battle group into a single 
distributed weapons system."27 If the CEC proves effective it will improve the timeline 
27 Joris Janssen Lok, "Three Thrusts for Naval Air Defense," Janes Defence Weekly, (3 April 
1996), 25. 
17 
of target data collection, analysis, dissemination, and weapon assignment while 
enhancing redundancy against jamming or environmentally-caused interference of 
targeted weapons.-28 More interesting, CEC will allow a ground force commander to task 
a Tomahawk cruise missile aboard a destroyer to strike a target using targeting data 
gathered from an Air Force surveillance aircraft. The potential of this integration is 
encouraging, however, caution is necessary pending resolution of certain critical 
command and control issues discussed in Chapter VI. 
28 Ibid. 
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IV. REVOLUTION AT SEA 
Rapid change in both U.S. military technologies and strategies has compelled the 
Navy to radically revise some of its operational concepts. This chapter considers the shift 
in the Navy's operational focus as reflected in recent key documents. 
A. CHANGE IN OPERATIONAL FOCUS 
In response to the demise of the Soviet threat, then Chief of Naval Operations, 
Carlisle Trost, modified the Maritime Strategy with the issuance of an article entitled 
"Maritime Strategy for the 1990's."29 After noting the end of the Cold War, the document 
expressed concern for the dangers posed by military applications of rapid technological 
advancements throughout the world. It noted that the "most worrisome aspect of the 
increasing diffusion of global political and military power is the accompanying spread of 
high-technology weaponry."30 
The trend suggested in "Maritime Strategy for the 1990's" was supported by the 
Navy's 1991 document "The Way Ahead."31 The dissipation of a bipolar world was 
29 Admiral Carlisle A. H. Trost, Chief of Naval Operations, "Maritime Strategy for the 
1990's", (as published in the Naval Institute Proceeding/Naval Review, 1990.) 
30 
"Maritime Strategy for the 1990's", 94. 
31 "The Way Ahead" was written by Secretary of the Navy H. Lawrence Garrett III with 
Chief ofNaval Operations, Admiral Frank B. Kelso II and Commandant of the Marine 
Corps, General A.M. Gray. Citations are from this document as published in The Naval 
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acknowledged as well as the increasing regional threat which accompanied it. This 
prompted the Navy to declare a change in ground rules and assumptions, leading to a 
restructured naval force with revisions in strategy, tactics and operating pattems.32 
Additionally, political and fiscal pressures associated with reducing the national debt 
were recognized as a concern which would unquestionably affect the level of resources 
available for defense . 
... From the Sea and its successor, Forward ... From the Sea, established the basic 
direction for the Navy today. The Navy's most recent attempt at spelling out the 
operational implications of ... From the Sea and F orward ... From the Sea, is a document 
known until the fall of 1996 as 2020 Vision.33 Though unpublished as ofthis writing, the 
ideas expressed in that document are suggestive of how Navy planners envision the 
exploitation of long-range precision strike capabilities. The ideas are formulated in a 
three-tier structure consisting of: (1) strategic options to break the enemy's will using 
precision operations to exploit critical enemy vulnerabilities; (2) operational options to 
attack the enemy's infrastructure which will require joint forces to identify specific key 
nodes in order to abort the enemy's means of fighting effectively; and (3) tactical options 
requiring direct combat with the support of information dominance. 34 
Institute Proceedings, (April1991). 
32 
••• From the Sea, 2. 
33 2020 Vision: A Nayy for the 21st Centw.y, (Office of the Chief ofNaval Operations, 
Washington, D.C.: draft copy 15 August 1996.) Cited with permission of Captain Smith 
of the CNO's Executive Panel, (henceforth noted as 2020 Vision.) 
34 Ibid, 6-7. 
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B. NAVAL EXPEDITIONARY WARFARE 
With the Navy's principal Cold War mission- to secure command of the sea 
against the Soviet threat - having effectively been obviated, the Navy reoriented its 
strategy toward influencing events on land. This entails a significant change in focus for 
the Navy, but adoption of a policy which concentrates on operations associated with the 
littoral is a logical and necessary strategic development. 
The use of naval forces in littoral waters against the land mass is not a new 
concept per se'. According to then Admiral William Owens: 
... Affecting events on land is not a new concern of naval forces. 
But in concert with the Marines (or mobile Army units) the navy's new 
operational concept goes far beyond the traditional notion of power 
projection to a broader concept, better understood as battlefield 
dominance. 35 
Naval expeditionary war, i.e. amphibious warfare, is one "traditional" way for 
naval forces to project power ashore. Carrier-based air strikes are another. Yet, neither 
are sufficient if the Navy is to make a decisive impact on the "halt-the-invasion" phase of 
a future MRC. The early drafts of2020 Vision proposed the Navy place reliance on 
precision operations, smart targeting, and massed fires from the sea. 36 One new naval 
platform, the Arsenal Ship, is being advocated as the means to bring early, massive, and 
35 William A. Owens, High Seas: The Naval Passage to an Uncharted World. 
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995), 78-79. 
36 2020 Vision, 9. 
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sustained firepower to bear against an aggressor. This ship is emerging as the Navy's 
answer to the question of how sea-based forces might have a decisive impact in a future 
MRC. 
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V. THE ARSENAL SHIP: A SYNTHESIS OF REVOLUTIONS 
In order to operationalize the strategic concepts laid out in the draft 2020 Vision 
paper, and specifically, make a decisive difference in the early phases of an MRC, the 
Navy must acquire the capability to bring large volumes of combat power to bear. 
Moreover, it must do so discriminately, that is to say, against targets that count and with 
little collateral damage. Air Force bombers can deliver large amounts of ordnance with 
relatively high precision. However, forward operating bases necessary for a high tempo 
of strike operations may not be available. Forward deployed Arsenal Ships are the 
Navy's solution. 
According to Rear Admiral Daniel J. Murphy, Director of the Surface Warfare 
Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (N86), the Arsenal Ship is "best 
defined as providing multifunctional support to the land battle in its role as the 'battleship 
of the 21st century'. "37 Norman Polmar, a leading naval strategist, noted that "this is the 
first completely new warship concept by the Navy since the 1950s when it developed the 
fleet ballistic missile submarine .. .it's an opportunity for Navy admirals to show they're 
not fighting the battle of Midway, but taking advantage of the newest technologies."38 
Naval planners have proposed that the Arsenal Ship can provide massive 
37 Scott C. Trover, "Floating Arsenal to be 21st Century Battleship," International 
Defense Review, 29, no. 7, (1 July 1996), 44. 
38 Norman Polmar, as cited by John Mintz in "Navy Developing Remote-Control Ship," 
Washington Post, (23 June 1996), 1. Mr. Polmar is a naval analyst, historian and former 
advisor to three secretaries of the Navy. 
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firepower in the initial stages of a conflict to halt an aggressor's advancement.39 The ship 
is envisioned to be a highly automated, missile-laden forward-deployed platform which 
will be capable of providing not only fire support for ground forces ashore, but also 
theater air defense, and theater ballistic missile defense. 40 Although it is a naval platform, 
as such, the Arsenal Ship advocates insist it will be a de facto joint system due to the 
variety of capabilities it is intended to have.41 
A. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 
On 11 April1996 the Navy promulgated The Arsenal Ship Concept of 
Operations.42 It contends that the Arsenal Ship is compatible with ... From the Sea and 
Forward ... From the Sea, and that it is designed to meet the challenges of current and 
anticipated future naval requirements in support of land battles. Given budget 
constraints, the ship is to be designed, built, and manned in an affordable manner, while 
providing a much needed enhancement to the existing force of carriers and land attack-
39 Captain Smith, interview conducted 20 May 1996. Commander R. Cameron Ingram, 
Surface Warfare Division, Plans Office, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (N863). 
Information from Commander Ingram was gathered during an interview conducted 23 
May 1996. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Captain Smith, interview conducted 20 May 1996. 
42 Rear Admiral Daniel J. Murphy, Memorandum for Distribution, Promulgation of The 
Arsenal Ship Concept of Operation, (11 April 1996). 
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combatants and submarines. 43 
1. Weapons Capability 
The Arsenal Ship is being designed with approximately 500 Vertical Launch 
System (VLS) cells and is intended to have space for future extended range gun systems. 44 
This is done so that the ship will be able to launch a diverse array of both current and 
future weapons. According to Captain Smith weapons under consideration for the 
Arsenal Ship program include: 
-a 155mm gun firing extended-range guided munitions out to 100nm (185km) 
- Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) with a range of approximately 1,500 
miles and a speed of 548rnilhr (885kmlhr) 
-Fast Hawk, a variant of the Hawk surface-to-air missile system in development, 
with an anticipated range of approximately 1, 000 miles and a terminal velocity of Mach 
3.5 to Mach 5 
-a land attack variant of the Navy's Standard Missile, known as the "Strike 
Standard" 
- SM-2 Block IV/IVA Standard Missile with extended range and a speed of over 
Mach 2.5 for theater air-defense 
43 Ibid, 1. 
44 Commander Jan VanTol, Office ofNet Assessment, Office of the Secretary ofDefense. 
This information was gathered during an interview conducted on 20 May 1996. 
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-a naval variant of the current 24-inch diameter battlefield missile Army Tactical 
Missile System (ATACMS) with a range of 60-160nm (11 0-295km)45 
-Sea SLAM, a variant of the air-launched Standoff Land-Attack Missile (SLAM) 
which is a modification of the Harpoon and can deliver a 500lb warhead over 50 miles 
(80km) 
- Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) for self-defense.46 
The Arsenal Ship will not necessarily be deployed with all of these weapons, nor is it 
intended to be limited to them. They simply illustrate the range of weapons capabilities 
the Navy has in mind. 
2. Interoperability 
The Arsenal Ship Concept of Operations states that the ship will employ the CEC 
discussed in Chapter III. According to Captain Smith, Navy planners view the ship as a 
"remote magazine" with remote missile selection, onboard missile initialization and 
remote launch capabilities. Initially the concept intends the "remote magazine" to be 
controlled by an accompanying Aegis weapons system; however, future plans are for this 
45 Test firing from a surface ship was conducted in February according to "The American 
Scud," Navy News & Undersea Technology, 12, No. 41, (23 October 1995). 
46 This list of weapons was compiled from interviews conducted with Captain Smith, 20 
May 1996, Commander Ingram, 23 May 1996, Commander Joseph Bouchard, Strategy 
and Concepts Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (N 513 ), 21 May 1996 
and from "Arsenal Ship ... 21st Century Battleship," a brief prepared for Admiral Hogg, 
USN (Retired) by OPNAV (N86), (23 May 1996), 3. 
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control to be extended across the joint spectrum, including the Air Force A WACS and 
JSTARS aircraft. There is even an employment concept that may eventually permit 
weapons' designation and launch by an individual ground force unit.47 
To illustrate how this might work the following example is provided: (1) a 
satellite, reconnaissance plane, shipboard radar or ground based unit detects a battery of 
SCUD missiles; (2) networking capabilities of the CEC allows all U.S. units in the area 
of responsibility (AOR) to instantly share the data; (3) a command to launch weapons 
from the Arsenal Ship deployed in the AOR is given by a remotely located commander 
(possibly on another ship, with ground forces, or on an AWACS aircraft); ( 4) resulting in 
weapons from the Arsenal Ship being remotely controlled to strike a designated target. 
Naval officials are quoted as saying, "the stockpile of missiles deployed aboard the 
Navy's future Arsenal Ship could be controlled by Army or Air Force officers depending 
on the mission. "48 
If this capability is realized it would potentially provide the Joint Task Force 
(JTF) commander with increased flexibility in determining the most appropriately suited 
weapon and platform for utilization in a strike. If this proves successful, then the Arsenal 
Ship would be one of the first truly joint platforms in the U.S. military inventory. 
47 Captain Smith, interview conducted 20 May 1996. 
48 Robert Holzer, "Commanders May Share Arsenal Ship Assets," Defense News, (17 
June 1996 - 23 June 1996), 10. 
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3. Manning 
The Arsenal Ship Concept of Operations says little about manning other than that 
the crew will be limited to no more than 50 personnel. It does, however, allow for some 
additional berthing space to accommodate special evolution detachments. Further review 
of this program indicates that advances in information technologies, stealth and weapons 
guidance should allow the Navy to operate the ship with a greatly reduced crew.49 
Automation in engineering, as well as weapons and damage control systems could reduce 
the need for large crews. This, in turn, could contribute to an increase in space available 
for VLS cells. In addition, a reduction in crew size could allow the ship to remain at sea 
for extended periods of time. This would be made possible by the rotation of crews via 
helicopters or ferrying them by transport boats. Merchant tankers have been crewed in 
this fashion for years. However, the concern has been expressed that small crews could 
seriously degrade damage control capabilities. Immediate damage control measures are 
often essential to the survival of a combat vessel in the event it sustains damage during 
combat. With a minimal crew on board the Arsenal Ship, questions remain unanswered 
as to its capability to effectively control combat damage or fire and flooding. 
49 Robert Holzer with Pat Cooper, "Warships May Use Leaner Crews; Report 
Recommends Additional Firepower for U.S. Navy Vessels," Defense News. (29 January-
4 February 1996), 4. 
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4. Ship Design 
The Arsenal Ship Concept of Operations states the design is to be based on 
commercial practices and incorporate previously mentioned automation. It is expected to 
have: (1) a double hull, which has not been used on a U.S. warship before; (2) a hull 
which will ride low in the water and incorporate additional stealthy features to degrade 
detection by enemy radar and sonar, such as those which have been tested on the Sea 
Shadow experimental ship or developed in the B-2 and F -11 7 A programs; and (3) have 
minimum structural features exposed on the deck and above with navigation being 
directed from a small deck-level conning station. 5° A possible submersion capability has 
also been discussed. 51 
Prior to selection of the Arsenal Ship, there were four alternatives the Navy 
considered. The first would have been a modification of Ohio-class SSBNs which the 
Navy is removing from strategic service. The second was a modified Arleigh Burke-class 
destroyer (DDG-51.) A third possibility considered the use of a modified commercial 
oiler. And the last was a new hull designed from the keel up, i.e. the Arsenal Ship itself. 52 
According to Captain Smith studies were conducted to assess the feasibility of 
50 Robert Holzer, "U.S. Navy Eyes Options as Arsenal Ship Takes Shape," Defense 
News, (5 February- 11 February 1996). 20, and Holzer," U.S. Navy's New Arsenal Ship 
Takes Shape," Defense News, (8 April- 14 Apri11996), 4. 
51 Commander VanTol, interview conducted on 20 May 1996. 
52 Ibid. 
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each option and the first three options were losing support for the following reasons. 53 A 
modified SSBN, though very stealthy and able to accommodate a reasonably large 
number ofVLS tubes, would be far too expensive to justify. The modified DDG-51 
concept would limit space available for VLS cells to approximately 150; therefore, the 
associated cost per launcher would have been steep, thus making it infeasible. The third 
option, the modified oiler, seemed to be fairly reasonable considering survivability of 
oilers struck by Iraqi and Iranian missiles during the "Tanker War" in the early 1980s. 
Obstacles presented with this option were the limited availability of U.S. oilers, limited 
lifetime coinciding with those that might be available, slow speeds and overall reduced 
capabilities. 
The fourth option of an entirely new hull has gained acceptance. The Navy, in an 
agreement with the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA), has awarded 
contracts to five shipbuilding/systems integration consortia "to develop a new low-
observable surface ship to provide firepower for long-range strike, naval surface fire 
support and theater air defense. "54 According to the agreement the five consortia will 
have six months to conduct studies and develop designs leading to the selection of two 
teams for a 12 month period of refining concepts and performance specifications into a 
functional design. Ultimately, one team will be selected to produce a detailed design, 
build a demonstrator, and submit an irrevocable offer for construction of five additional 
53 Captain Smith, interview conducted on 20 May 1996. 
54 
"Arsenal Ship Programme Launched," Jane's Navy International, 101, No.7, Richard 
Scott, Editor (1 September 1996), 5. 
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vessels as well as the conversion of the demonstrator into an operational unit. 55 The goal 
for the demonstrator to go to sea for trials is fiscal year 2000. 
B. COSTS 
With budgetary restrictions playing such an important role in the post Cold War 
era, the Arsenal Ship may be well suited to filling the littoral gap in a cost efficient 
manner. The following three areas are viewed as primary cost saving segments of the 
Arsenal Ship program: (1) research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E), (2) 
weapons capacity, and (3) personnel costs. 
1. Research, Development, Test and Evaluation 
On 18 March 1996, the Navy and DARPA signed an agreement to jointly develop 
the Arsenal Ship. The cost of development, production of the demonstrator and 
performance testing and fleet evaluation was agreed not to exceed $520 million with the 
Navy and DARPA funding $350 million and $170 million respectively.56 Compared to 
55 Ibid. 
56 Larry Lynn, John W. Douglass and J. M. Boorda, "Arsenal Ship Program," Joint 
Memorandum from the office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Assistant Secretary of the 
Navy (Research, Development, and Acquisition), for Commander, Naval Sea Systems 
Command, Chief of Naval Research, (18 March 1996.) Mr. Lynn is Director, Defense 
Advanced Research Project Agency, and Mr. Douglass is Assistant Secretary ofthe Navy 
(Research, Development and Acquisition). Admiral Boorda was Chief of Naval 
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an estimated building cost of $4.5 billion for a new Nimitz-class aircraft carrier, $1.9 
billion for a new Ohio-class submarine, or $800 million for a new Arleigh Burke-class 
destroyer, the project funding goal appeared modest and considerate of the constraints of 
current budgeting issues. The Navy and DARPA also agreed that only off-the-shelf 
systems were to be used. Any new systems proposed for development would require the 
specific approval of the Assistant Secretary ofthe Navy (Research, Development, and 
Acquisition.) 
Extended deployment cycles are planned for this platform. The automation of 
shipboard systems is expected to permit a substantial reduction in crew. With an 
anticipated crew of 50 or less, rotations will not require the Arsenal Ship to pull into port. 
Meanwhile, the capability of housing a large number of weapons potentially allows the 
Arsenal Ship to remain at sea for extended periods of time during combat. 
2. Weapons Capacity 
The cost of weapons intended for the Arsenal Ship poses a concern. With a 
capability of housing 500 PGMs, the Arsenal Ship will potentially carry approximately 
$500 million worth of munitions. 
The trade off for the benefit of advanced technology incorporated in PGMs is the 
more expensive cost per round than that associated with conventional munitions. At 
Operations. 
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$800,000 each, the Tomahawk cruise missile is the most expensive missile expected to be 
placed on the ship. 57 
Nevertheless the technology provided by precision strike might also contribute to 
an overall reduction in cost. If the Arsenal Ship's stealth features, coupled with the 
defenses of the Aegis system, are as effective as Navy planners anticipate, then this 
platform would seem to have an increased chance of delivering its weapons without 
significant interference from enemy defenses. Therefore, the PGMs potentially will have 
an increased rate of direct hits on their designated targets. This combination could reduce 
the number of weapons required to be employed to destroy a target. Meanwhile, 
logistical requirements for an operation could be substantially reduced. 
Additionally, the precise load-out of an Arsenal Ship may vary based on 
predetermined threats and objectives. Accordingly, the numbers of any given weapons 
system would likely vary for each deployment.58 Therefore, the exact cost associated 
with weapons housed on board an Arsenal Ship seems difficult to determine in advance. 
It is prudent to say, however, that the cost associated with the weapons on an Arsenal 
Ship, in both the type of weapons and the numbers which it can carry, will be substantial. 
3. Personnel 
57 Andrew F. Krepinevich, "Letters To The Editor," Washington Post, (27 July 1996). 
58 Captain Smith, interview conducted 20 May 1996. 
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Emerging RMAs and their products are typically underwritten by advances in 
technology. In today's environment such advances are predominantly associated with 
computers and related information technologies. With the improvements in computer 
technology made during the past several decades, far more can be accomplished with 
fewer people and in much less time, speaking in general terms. From this arises the 
question to what extent would the technologies incorporated into the Arsenal Ship impact 
manpower requirements? Little information is currently available on this issue, but it 
appears as though Navy officials are assuming increased automation will equate to 
decreased personnel. 
Recalling that the Navy intends to incorporate innovative stealthy features on the 
Arsenal Ship, stealth itself might assist the Navy in its efforts to reduce personnel 
requirements. If, in fact, stealth platforms do have greatly increased survivability due to 
their ability to evade detection, it seems to logically follow that fewer platforms will be 
required. Having only a few platforms, coupled with extensive automation, would 
concurrently reduce the number of operators. 
Staging requirements could potentially be reduced as well. With limited numbers 
of Arsenal Ships having extended deployment periods - currently no more than six are 
planned - there would not be an extensive need for shipyard support. However, since 
maintenance personnel might require additional training to support the needs of advanced 
systems associated with this ship, the initial indication is that these manpower numbers 
might be increased. However, considering that fewer platforms will be required, these 
manpower needs could possibly be reduced as well. As a result it appears as though the 
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cost savings, associated with a limited number of personnel required to support the 
Arsenal Ship, could be substantial. 59 Should all the pieces of the Arsenal Ship fall into 
place, the Navy may very well reap benefits from the platform's reduced personnel 
requirements and their associated costs. However, questions still exist regarding the 
previously mentioned damage control issue and until those are satisfactorily answered, as 
well as questions which follow in the next section, more investigation into actual costs 
and benefits from drastically reduced manning will be needed. 
C. QUESTIONS AND CONCERNS 
Like any new program the Arsenal Ship has its share of critics. There are those 
who believe the Navy does not need any additional ships in light ofthe lack of a 
dominant threat to U.S. national security. Others acknowledge the threats posed by 
regional conflicts, but do not feel that the Arsenal Ship presents a substantial 
improvement to current capabilities. 60 
59 Ibid. 
6° Critical assessments include Greg Pickell's article"Arsenal Ship Fails to Hit the Mark", 
Defense News, (16 October 1995-22 October 1995), 55; William Lloyd Stearman's 
article "A Misguided Missile Ship; Old Battleships Would Do a Better Job Than a Pricey 
New Boat" Washington Post, (7 July 1996), C03; and Robert C. Penison's article 
"Gunfire to Get Them Off the Beach", Washington Post, (14 August 1996), A20. 
35 
1. Weapons Cost 
The cost of weapons seems to be one of the largest points of contention between 
the program's supporters and its antagonists. With the large volume of weapons intended 
to be housed on an Arsenal Ship and the intention of those weapons to be mostly 
technically advanced systems, adversaries of the program contend that the ship itself may 
not have a high price tag, but the associated costs of its weapons will be excessive. 
The array of missiles being considered for the Arsenal Ship will cost $500,000 to 
$1.5 million per missile, according to the Nayy Times (July 29, 1996.) If these costs are 
accurate then an Arsenal Ship could potentially carry an estimated $2 billion worth of 
weapons. Although these estimates seem excessive, with the cost of a Tomahawk being 
the most expensive of the intended weapons at $800,000, a completely loaded ship would 
still have a very high weapons cost. Skeptics of the program cite Admiral Boorda's own 
concern that "it is nice occasionally if the target costs more than the bullet you shoot," as 
a summation of their argument. 61 
An opposing view to this concern is that the U.S. military will have a vast 
inventory of weapons anyway, so why not have them forward deployed and immediately 
available to a theater Commander-in-Chief (CINC) instead of stockpiled in the United 
States? The capability of the Arsenal Ship to help alleviate the stockpiling problem, 
while housing the weapons in a manner which makes them ready for immediate use, is 
61 David Evans, "The Navy's Blues," New York Times, (8 June 1996,) 15. 
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one of the goals presented in a brief on 29 August by the Navy's Surface Warfare 
Division. 62 
2. Survivability 
Loading up one ship with such an expensive cache of weapons raises the issue of 
platform survivability. If a CINC concentrates a majority of theater assets in one 
platform, as opposed to the Cold War strategy of dispersion, that platform would 
logically become the primary target of adversaries in the region. Therefore, the 
protection of an Arsenal Ship would be essential. 
Current designs for the Arsenal Ship incorporate few self-defense measures. The 
most touted measure is that of a double hull, yet, it does not in itself seem sufficient. 
Additionally, there have been discussions of a small complement of last ditch self-
defense systems such as the Phalanx Close-in-Weapons-System but a final decision is yet 
to be made. 63 The vulnerability of the platform has been acknowledged by naval 
planners, however, they never intended to jeopardize this platform by deploying it 
without an escort. 64 The Arsenal Ship is being designed in affiliation with the Aegis 
system as noted in the operational concept specifying, "the Arsenal Ship will operate in 
62 "The Arsenal Ship," briefprepared by OPNAV (N86), (29 August 1995), 3. 
63 Commander VanTol, interview conducted 20 May 1996. 
64 Captain Smith , interview conducted 20 May 1996. 
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any threat environment under the protective umbrella of battle force combatants, 
however, it must have self-defense measures which reinforce its survivability against 21st 
century anti-ship missiles, torpedoes and mines. "65 
Passive defense is the predominant self-defense measure that the ship will rely 
on. "Passive defense will allow the Arsenal Ship to capitalize on the benefits of mass 
tonnage, innovative applications of multiple hull integrity, and signature reduction."66 
Stealth technology is intended to be utilized in the design of a hull with a low radar cross 
section in order to evade enemy radar. Navy planners intend for the Arsenal Ship to ride 
very low in the water and have radar-suppressing surfaces and shapes to assist in reducing 
its radar cross section.67 Another stealth feature to be incorporated is that of technology 
associated with wake reduction and acoustic propagation. 68 A number of stealth related 
technologies such as these have been successfully tested on the Navy prototype ship 
know as the "Sea Shadow". 
The second major selling point for survivability is that of a double hull. This is a 
design which would enhance the hull integrity against mines, missiles and torpedoes. 
Never before has a U.S. warship used such a design; yet, the additional protection 
provided by this structure will increase the probability of survival. Strikes against current 
ships in the U.S. fleet with single hulls have demonstrated respectable survivability as 
65 Rear Admiral Murphy, "Promulgation ofthe Arsenal Ship Concept of Operations," 4. 
66 Ibid. 
67 John Mintz, "Navy Developing Remote-Control Ship," A22. 
68 Commander Ingram, interview conducted 23 May 1996. 
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recently as the Persian Gulf War, therefore, doubling the hull on the Arsenal Ship is a 
strong selling point for the Navy.69 The problem with this approach is that most mines 
which have been struck have been very small and of old design. 
Skeptics do not seem to believe these measures will be sufficient. In a recent 
article, William Stearman questions "how can it be a 'stealth ship' when it requires an 
easily located escort fleet for protection?"70 Logic implies that if the Arsenal Ship is 
deployed without an escort fleet, its stealth features, while likely to reduce its possibility 
of detection, would not be able to guarantee it remained undetected. In the event the ship 
were to be detected, by perhaps a diesel submarine, a double hull could prove insufficient 
to guarantee survivability of the platform. 
If this program cannot provide more assurances for the survival of an Arsenal 
Ship, then some skeptics of the program seem justified with their concerns. The apparent 
vulnerability of an Arsenal Ship may present difficulties for JTF commanders who may 
be risking a substantial amount of their theater assets if Arsenal Ships are fully loaded yet 
haven't been able to ensure enhanced survivability. 
69 Captain Smith, interview conducted 20 May 1996. 
70 William L. Stearman, "The Navy's Proposed Arsenal Ship," The Retired Officer 
Magazine, 102, No. 11, (November 1996), 39. Mr. Stearman is a former Navy officer 
and member of the White House National Security Council staff. 
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3. Battleships 
Besides his concerns over survivability, Stearman claims that the Iowa-class 
battleships could provide substantial firepower more cost-effectively. He insisted that, 
missiles are "fine for distant, high-value, fixed-targets, but for supporting troops locked in 
combat, 16-inch rounds are not only infinitely cheaper, but have substantially greater 
penetration and blast effects and disperse submunitions as well, if not better. "
71 He 
claimed that with current technology the range of these rounds can be extended from 30 
to 1 00 miles. 
Although there are valid points in arguments such as these, other issues seem to 
be either ignored or misinterpreted. An example is the vulnerability of 50 year old 
battleships. According to Andrew Krepinevich we need only to be reminded that "a 
single shell from the German warship Bismarck sunk the British battleship HMS Hood, 
... or of the Japanese torpedo attack on Pearl Harbor's 'Battleship Row."172 In light of 
weapons advancements in the past 50 years, the vulnerability of these ships appears to be 
substantially increased. 73 
Additionally, the spectrum of capabilities planned for the Arsenal Ship is far 
71 Stearman, "A Misguided Missile Ship ... ". 
72 Krepinevich, Washington Post. 
73 Ibid. 
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greater than that of a battleship.74 Arsenal Ships are intended to carry anti-ballistic and 
anti-tactical missiles while also having a 155mm gun that will provide ground support 
firepower. Unmanned aerial vehicles may also be carried. "The Arsenal Ship's flexibility 
is as varied as the weapons we choose to put aboard," says Captain Smith. 75 Meanwhile, 
many more personnel are required to operate a battleship than an Arsenal Ship and the 
need for logistical support for a battleship is substantially greater. 
D. EARLY SUPPORT 
In January 1988 then Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf III published thoughts on a 
"Revolution at Sea."76 He took note of the enormous expansion over the past decade in 
the warship's battlespace especially as the result of the 1,200-mile Tomahawk missile.'m 
Metcalfs article discussed issues such as redesigning ship superstructures for a 
modem era with little more than a conning station visible on the deck. He also proposed 
that the warfighting policy of a revolutionary Navy would be to maximize a warship's 
ability to deliver ordnance on target. With this tasking, he conceptualized a ship designed 
74 Edward A. Smith, "Naval Firepower for the 2P1 Century," Washington Post, Op-Ed 
Section, (27 July 1996). 
75 Ibid. 
76 Joseph Metcalfiii, Vice Admiral, USN (Ret), "Revolutions at Sea," U.S. Naval 
Institute Proceedings, 114, no. 1019, (January 1988), 34-39. 
77 Ibid, 36. 
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with an extensive volume of weapons, most likely VLS cells for cruise missiles. 78 
An emerging concern of the RMA is a need to increase the number of individually 
targetable missiles in theater to counter future threats. The Arsenal Ship conceptually 
provides up to 500 VLS cells which could substantially improve capabilities to counter 
these threats. 
Issues such as increased missile capacity, automation, reduced manpower 
requirements, and a stealthy ship design espoused by Metcalf are being incorporated into 
the Arsenal Ship.79 Additionally, efforts by the Navy to examine potential RMA issues 
have resulted in the utilization of the Arsenal Ship in a number of recent wargames. 
Metcalf concluded that technology alone could not lead the way of the future 
Navy. He stressed the need for the Navy and its leadership to "step up to the mark," as 
revolutions occurring across the spectrum require innovation within the naval ranks. 
Supporters of the Arsenal Ship assert the Navy has acknowledged this necessity and 
through the Arsenal Ship program the Navy is pursuing innovative methods to ensure its 
viability in the next century. 
78 Ibid, 38. 
79 Captain Smith, interview conducted 20 May 1996. 
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VI. OPERATIONAL USE OF THE ARSENAL SHIP 
Having reviewed the strategic and technological changes currently impacting the 
U.S. military and examining the physical attributes of the Arsenal Ship and its associated 
systems, the next step is to address the actual employment of the ship. In doing so the 
ship needs to be assessed as to whether it will provide the United States with a joint 
capability that fills the strategic gaps of the post Cold War and presents innovative ways, 
consistent with the RMA, of dealing with the future. This includes a review of its 
anticipated effectiveness in carrying out its military missions, discussions regarding 
command and control issues, and its potential for joint interoperability. 
A. MISSION 
The missions of the battleship, aircraft carrier and Arsenal Ship share a number of 
similarities as well as differences. The similarities revolve around their primary goal of 
power projection, while their differences are defined by the technology associated with 
their respective eras of development. With respect to the battleship, Richard Hough has 
written how, "like most weapons of destruction created in times of peace, the first 
function of the battleship was to instill fear in the hearts of men. For almost a century the 
threat of the armored battleship fleet was the first instrument of power diplomacy. 80 It 
80 Richard Hough, Death of the Battleship, 4. 
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was specifically designed for destroying similar targets, i.e. other battleships. 
With the modernization ofthe U.S. fleet, through the incorporation of aircraft 
carriers during World War II, continuity of the battleship mission of power projection and 
forward presence was maintained. However, the carrier redefined this mission through 
the use of sustained long-range strike. With further modernization in strategy and 
technology it appears as though Navy planners intend for the Arsenal Ship to play a 
similar role in redefining the Navy's mission through massive firepower and precision 
warfare. 
The Air Force has long had the ability to extend its range of strike through the use 
of intercontinental bombers and intercontinental ballistic missiles. These options have 
arguably been favorable to carrier based aircraft due to a reduced risk of collateral 
damage. According to Commander Ingram, the Arsenal Ship would risk relatively little 
collateral damage; yet it could provide a JTF with a substantial strike capability that is 
more timely than the Air Force alternatives. 
Technology has added PGMs to the equation. Cruise missiles, such as the 
TLAM, have gained utility as a primary means of conducting strikes. The combination 
of extended range and precision guidance system enhances the chances of commanders 
reducing the risk to their platforms and personnel. This is accomplished by launching 
weapons from far greater distances than was possible in previous eras. At the same time 
PGMs provide theater platforms with an immediate response capability due to their 
increased delivery speeds over more conventional weapons. 
As Krepinevich stated in his recent publication "A New Navy for a New Era," 
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these systems and munitions have increasingly been encroaching on operations "turf' that 
was once the sole preserve of the carriers.81 If such changes continue to occur, might it be 
possible that the role of the aircraft carrier could decrease while other platforms such as 
the Arsenal Ship take on a greater naval role? This is not to say the aircraft carrier will no 
longer be needed. In the foreseeable future there remain a number of missions which will 
still be more aptly suited to the abilities of the carrier than a platform such as the Arsenal 
Ship, specifically that of sustained strike operations.82 
A closer look at the potential effects of the Arsenal Ship shows a variety of 
operational capabilities. Some are redundant, yet this platform is intended to provide an 
enhanced capability tailored toward massive strike during the initial stages of a conflict to 
meet the demands of... From the Sea and Forward ... From the Sea. Currently, there is no 
U.S. national asset which can accomplish this task as rapidly and decisively as a 
permanently deployed ship containing 500 VLS cells. 
1. Forward Operations 
The Bottom-Up Review focused attention on the U.S. military's need to prepare 
for two MRCs. Accordingly, Forward ... From the Sea states the Navy shall maintain a 
81 Andrew Krepinevich, Jr., "A New Navy for A New Era," 6. 
82 Richard Hough, Death of the Battleship, 13. 
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posture of forward operations. 83 This is visualized as a means to provide peacetime 
presence and crisis response in the event of a regional conflict. The current means by 
which the Navy accomplishes this mission is through the deployment of carrier 
battlegroups (CVBGs) and Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs). However, budgetary 
reductions in the 1990's make continual overseas presence of CVBGs increasingly 
difficult to sustain. 
A number of options for sustaining the Navy's forward presence have been 
proposed. Among those proposals, the Arsenal Ship is relatively cheap to build, much 
less expensive to operate than a carrier and could provide a theater CINC with 
capabilities currently unavailable. 
One of the primary requirements for the Navy's forward deployed forces is to 
"satisfy joint naval expeditionary force warfighting requirements early in regional 
conflicts."84 The Arsenal Ship is designed to accomplish this via three avenues: "(1) 
massive firepower, (2) exploiting technology, and (3) providing resources to meet the 
tasks. "85 According to Captain Smith and Commander Ingram, the first could be 
provided by the overwhelming firepower of the Arsenal Ship. The littoral focus of this 
ship is a shift from traditional naval concerns of fighting open-ocean battles. Instead, this 
83 Forward ... From the Sea, 2. 
84 
"The Arsenal Ship", N86 brief of29 Aug 95, 4. 
85 Ibid, 5. 
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ship is intended to provide massive firepower in the initial stages of a conflict effectively 
halting an adversary's aggression.86 
The second is proposed to be accomplished through an array of technical 
advancements associated with the Arsenal Ship, such as the integration of PGMs and the 
Cooperative Engagement Capability. Effective utilization of the CEC would conceivably 
allow enhanced distribution of targeting data among theater assets. This, in turn, should 
provide a CINC with the capability of selectively targeting vital enemy assets. The 
combination of such targeting and the use of PGMs in attacking those targets is intended 
to enhance the probability of hitting vital targets with fewer rounds. 87 
The third avenue is intended to be accomplished through the diversity of weapons 
available in an Arsenal Ship. Navy planners insist that when a CINC determines he needs 
ground fire support, the Arsenal Ship will have the capability to deliver it. If the CINC 
determines theater ballistic missile defense (TBMD) is the primary threat, the ship will be 
able to deploy weapons in support of this. The Arsenal Ship is also intended to provide 
theater air defense (TAD). In theory, the ship should contribute to the joint concept of 
"full-spectrum dominance" through its ability to provide support to allied assets 
throughout the theater and in numerous missions. The Arsenal Ship's weapons capability 
and mission requirements are not to be limited to traditional naval operations. Instead it 
is proposed to combine the strategic requirements of ... From the Sea with those of the 
86 Commander Ingram, interview conducted 23 May 1996. 
87 Captain Smith, interview conducted 20 May 1996. 
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National Military Strategy and Joint Vision 2010 resulting in a platform that can 
potentially fill very diverse mission requirements across the joint spectrum. 
It has also been proposed that the Arsenal Ship can provide a solution to the 
problem of vulnerable ammunition stockpiles. During Desert Storm, if the SCUD missile 
that struck near a pier stockpiled with U.S. ammunition at Jubayl, Saudi Arabia on 16 
February 1991, had done so closer-in, vast amounts of ordnance could have been lost. In 
order to alleviate vulnerabilities such as this in the future, the Arsenal Ship is envisioned 
as having the means to house a vast amount of ammunition while also maintaining it in 
such a manner that it is combat ready. 
Another concern of Navy planners is the "force architecture which identified 
vertical launch system shortfalls early in a major regional conflict. "88 This architecture 
identifies less than 1 000 VLS cells available during the first eight days of a conflict under 
current surface combatant capabilities. 89 With a regional presence of two Arsenal Ships, 
which is the intention ofNavy planners, the number ofVLS cells available during these 
first eight days would be more than doubled. Such a presence indicates a vast increase in 
naval firepower support in the early stages of an MRC.90 With the complement of 
weapons projected for an Arsenal Ship, its diversity should allow the ship to provide 
88 





massive firepower ranging from strike to surface fire support to theater air defense. 
2. Strike 
The actual strike role of the Arsenal Ship seems to have a number of possibilities. 
The weapons and the design of the ship are proposed to afford the Navy, as well as the 
other branches of the armed forces, an opportunity to create innovative strike packages. 
According to Commander Bouchard, this is not to say that current strike packages are 
obsolete. On the contrary in many cases they may prove to be more than adequate, but if 
innovative packaging can provide more effective results with less risk to U.S. personnel 
then the Arsenal Ship may put a new face on the way strike packages are viewed. 91 
The DOD specifically required the incorporation oflongMrange strike capabilities 
in addition to expeditionary ground support and fleet support capabilities into the Arsenal 
Ship. The increasing technological development in the area ofPGMs should enhance the 
Arsenal Ship's capability of destroying strategic targets. It should also provide increased 
means of suppressing enemy air defenses as well as demolishing enemy military 
infrastructures.92 These longMrange strike measures could be coupled with the ability to 
provide early intervention against hundreds of targets. 
According to Captain Smith the benefits of successful effects from early 
91 Commander Bouchard, interview conducted on 21 May 1996. 
92 Commander Ingram, interview conducted 23 May 1996. 
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firepower provided by the Arsenal Ship can be substantial. First it could ensure the 
continued exploitation of freedom of the seas by the deterrence and power projection role 
it is envisioned to have. This could be accomplished by respecting the sovereignty of 
partners due to the range and maneuverability of the Arsenal Ship. This exploitation 
could allow minimizing the use of early land-based units, that have recently lost access to 
a number of overseas staging facilities through base closures. Secondly, massive 
firepower is intended to punish the enemy from the initial stages of combat operations. 
According to the recent OPNA V brief" Arsenal Ship ... 21 st Century Battleship," the intent 
is to have 1,000 VLS cells available in less than a week. This capability is intended to 
enhance the credibility of those forces that are forward deployed. Next, the Arsenal Ship 
could free-up early airlift tasked with transporting munitions into the theater. This 
capability will potentially make airlift available to provide support across a much larger 
spectrum. Finally, it will increase the time tactical air components have for preparations 
of traditional roles such as combat air support, combat air patrol, and strategic strike. 
3. Interoperability 
Perhaps the most dramatic change from traditional strike operations that the 
Arsenal Ship would incorporate is its operation under the CEC. As previously indicated 
the Arsenal Ship "allows for remote missile selection, on-board missile initialization and 
remote launch orders, and provides remote 'missile away' messages to the control 
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platform. "93 This "program seeks to combine all the combat systems and major sensors 
on ships into a single, integrated architecture for intelligence, surveillance, 
reconnaissance, and C41. "94 The CEC has the potential to provide commanders with "a 
dramatically improved picture of the extended battle area and greatly improve their 
ability to engage targets successfully at extended ranges employing long-range precision 
strikes. "95 As a fully integrated component of the Arsenal Ship, CEC could potentially 
utilize the weapons capability of this ship to enhance the Navy's long-range strike assets 
in a way never before attainable. 
The benefits the Navy could reap from such an asset seem worth the investment. 
"The Navy's strike capabilities are not likely to be sustained at today's level of 
effectiveness unless the Navy can meet the challenge of increasingly capable Third World 
military systems."96 To do this the Navy will have to "increase its emphasis on 
conducting long-range precision strikes, and on defending the fleet from the threat of 
submarines, mines, and anti-ship missiles."97 According to Krepinevich's "A New Navy 
For A New Era", the Arsenal Ship will be able to outrange carriers by virtue of its 
93 
"Promulgation of the Arsenal Ship Concept of Operations," 2. 
94 Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., "A New Navy For A New Era," 40-41. 





missiles and the missiles' reduced vulnerability. The latter, claims Krepinevich, will 
allow Arsenal Ships to operate more closely to shore than carriers. The Arsenal Ship is 
touted as having the ability to undertake offensive mining and countermine operations, 
and still operate with less detection - and less protection - in the littoral areas than 
carriers, however, the skepticism presented in the previous chapter regarding 
vulnerability raises questions as to the accuracy of these points. Meanwhile, 
Krepinevich's point that "an emphasis on a more balanced, more distributed fleet that 
exploits advancing technologies under the CEC, could provide future fleet commanders 
as well as CINCs with a variety of options for conducting strike and presence operations," 
seems well founded.98 
B. COMMAND AND CONTROL 
The implementation of CEC, though promising in many respects, raises 
fundamental questions about command and control. With the control of Arsenal Ship 
weapons being located elsewhere in the theater, the Arsenal Ship's commanding officer 
will have relatively little responsibility for actually fighting the ship. This would present 
a major paradigm shift from the historical role of a ship's commanding officer and would 
represent a major institutional change for the Navy. 
Aside from institutional concerns, who decides what goes into the tubes and who 
will actually control the launching are two primary command and control questions. 
98 Ibid. 
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According to Captain Smith, the theater CINC would determine the load-out of an 
Arsenal Ship prior to deployment based on the theater threat assessment. The decision for 
control of targeting and shooting is still being refined; however, the best estimate is that 
control would be handled in a manner similar to that currently associated with the 
Tomahawk cruise missile. 
Questions regarding who decides the actual location of the Arsenal Ship, control 
of the multipurpose radars, and which mission will be assigned for multiple-mission 
weapons are also yet to be resolved, though discussions seem to be leaning toward the 
JTF commander. 99 Whether or not the JTF commander will delegate any or all of these 
roles, or will have the legal option to do so, remains unclear. 
One additional concern is that of too much access leading to confusion. This 
concern is meant to address the issue surrounding future projections for the CEC. If the 
CEC ultimately includes a ground force unit with the capability oflaunching a weapon 
from the Arsenal Ship, while additional units such as AWACS, JST ARS, Aegis system 
and F/A-18 simultaneously have that same capability, command and control issues could 
become tangled. There would have to be a control point to ensure different units were not 
tasking the same weapon and that conflicting use of weapons does not occur. 
99 Commander Bouchard, interview conducted 21 May 1996. 
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C. JOINT WARFIGHTING CAPABILITIES 
The Arsenal Ship has been conceived and espoused as a fully integrated joint 
platform. 10° First, it is intended to have strategic mobility and protection capabilities with 
the ability to operate in forward positions. With fewer personnel on board and the 
protective umbrella of the Aegis system, the Arsenal Ship should be able to remain 
forward deployed for extended periods of time. Therefore, it should be able to provide 
continuous force presence and a forward magazine capacity. 101 
Secondly, as previously mentioned, it is intended to have an excellent strike 
capability. With the massive volume of weapons an Arsenal Ship is anticipated to have, 
the Navy proposes the Arsenal Ship will be able to provide sustained and coordinated 
long-range strikes. 102 
The third capability intended to support joint warfighting is direct support to the 
land campaign. The Arsenal Ship is perceived to have the flexibility of positioning in such 
a manner as to effectively interdict advancing armor and to deliver battlefield operational 
fires in support ofU.S. ground forces in the region. 103 
10
° Captain Smith, interview 20 May 1996. 
101 
"The Arsenal Ship," 7. 
102 Commander Ingram, interview conducted 23 May 1996. 
103 Ibid. 
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A fourth joint capability would seem to be that of contributing to air superiority 
and countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). This is envisioned through the 
combination of theater air defense and theater ballistic missile defense weapons planned 
for the Arsenal Ship. Having a permanent availability of these weapons coupled with the 
remote magazine concept would considerably enhance air superiority and efforts to 
counter WMD. 
Finally, there is the area of command and control. The Arsenal Ship is intended to 
be fully joint interoperable and capable of remotely firing weapons. 104 The combination of 
these capabilities appears to be the Navy's proposal for its contribution to affecting events 





This thesis asked the question whether changes that brought about the shift in the 
Navy's strategic focus from open-ocean to littoral warfare have created a shortfall in U.S. 
naval land attack capabilities; and if so, whether the Navy's proposed Arsenal Ship is the 
right choice for rectifying the situation? To analyze these questions, four areas were 
examined: the strategic revolution (Chapter II), the Revolution in Military Affairs 
(Chapter III), the resultant naval revolution (Chapter IV), the Arsenal Ship as a synthesis 
of revolutions (Chapter V), and the operational concepts of the Arsenal Ship (Chapter 
VI). 
Neither the strategic revolution in the wake of the end of the Cold War, nor the 
Revolution in Military Affairs alone appear to be sufficient justifications for a new ship 
capability. However, when the two are combined, implications for future warfare 
indicate a need for a new ship capability. The combination of a new strategy which 
focuses on operating in the littoral regions of the world so as to affect events on land, plus 
an evolving era of technological advancements, suggests that current Navy ships would 
lack the capabilities necessary to ensure the Navy's ability to support dominant 
battlespace superiority. 
A. STRATEGIC CHANGES DRIVING THE 21ST CENTURY NAVY 
The Navy no longer bases its strategic thinking on the concept of open-ocean 
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naval warfare. This strategy was the focal point of the Cold War; however, in the post 
Cold War era and for the foreseeable future this strategic approach is no longer 
warranted. With the publication of ... From the Sea, the Navy made a fundamental shift 
away from open-ocean warfighting on the sea toward a strategy of joint operations 
conducted from the sea. How and against what "kinds" of opponents the Navy should 
prepare to fight was spelled out in the Bottom-Up Review. 
The question Navy planners have found themselves confronted with is how their 
service can effectively contribute to operations during a regional conflict that will 
predominantly occur on or over land. This must be done in a manner which enables the 
Navy to retain enough warfighting capabilities in reserve to thwart a second regional 
conflict should one arise. In order to support joint operations required to accomplish 
these goals, the Navy is focusing on increasing its naval expeditionary warfare 
capabilities. Naval planners will have to concentrate efforts on training in the littoral; 
however, current ship capabilities limit the extent to which this can be done. A new ship 
designed to operate in the littoral might provide the Navy with an effective means to 
accomplish these goals. 
B. RMA IMPLICATIONS 
The extensive advancements in technology in today's military environment 
indicate the necessity for modernization ofU.S. capabilities if the United States is to 
maintain its dominant role in international security and protect U.S. interests overseas. 
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Stealth, global technology, long-range precision strike, information warfare, and the 
effective use of space characterize the current technological movement. The rate at which 
battlefield information can be collected, analyzed and disseminated is rapidly 
approaching a rate far greater than most current capabilities can counter. The key to the 
RMA appears to be precision warfare. The utilization of precision guided munitions 
tasked to strike targets which are determined essential, through the use of information 
warfare technology, will alleviate unnecessary expenditure of weapons and should vastly 
increase the target-kill ratio. In addition to the increasing emphasis on PGMs, the 
concept of a Cooperative Engagement Capability which fuzes sensor data from multiple 
platforms into composite tracks of fire control quality could effectively transform a naval 
battlegroup into a distributed weapons system. Innovative technologies and capabilities 
such as these will most likely be the norm in the 21st century; therefore, the Navy must 
continue to modernize in concert with advancements in technology and in military 
strategy. 
C. THE ARSENAL SHIP 
Under the Arsenal Ship's operational concept, each ship will have 500 VLS cells 
capable of carrying an array of current and future weapons. These weapons will range in 
mission capability from land attack to TAD and TBMD. The Arsenal Ship is to be highly 
automated, requiring a crew of no more than 50 personnel, and it is to be operated in 
conjunction with the CEC for remote targeting. 
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1. Design 
The actual design of the Arsenal Ship is still in development; however, Navy 
planners expect it will have a double hull which will ride low in the water, have stealthy 
features so as to minimize the probability of detection by enemy radar and sonar, and 
have minimal structural features above the water line. After reviewing a number of 
platform options, the Navy, working with DARPA, has decided to design an entirely new 
ship. A demonstrator ship is scheduled for sea trials in fiscal year 2000. 
2. Cost 
An obvious concern is cost. The RDT&E cost of the Arsenal Ship was agreed by 
the Navy and DARPA not to exceed $520 million which is far less than the building cost 
of an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer. Meanwhile, the associated cost of weapons to be 
carried on the Arsenal Ship is estimated to be rather high. Nevertheless the configuration 
of weapons on the Arsenal Ship will be determined by the theater CINC based on his 
threat assessment. As a result, the associated cost will fluctuate. Additionally, having 
these weapons housed on the Arsenal Ship ready for use, rather than stockpiled in 
warehouses or on piers, make the ship an attractive option. 
Personnel related costs have been presented with the potential of substantial 
savings. The incorporation of extensive automation indicates the potential for dramatic 
reductions in crew size. Consequently fewer lives will be put at risk. With crew changes 
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via helicopter or other capabilities, ship deployments can be greatly extended. 
Subsequently, this indicates the manpower requirements associated with the Arsenal Ship 
could be dramatically reduced, resulting in a potential cost benefit for the Navy. 
3. Detractors 
Survivability of the Arsenal Ship poses some concern. With few self-defense 
measures intended to be incorporated other than a double hull and some stealth features, 
it would seem that the Arsenal Ship could be a "sitting duck." The Navy has considered 
this point and intends to deploy the Arsenal Ship in conjunction with an Aegis equipped 
platform and perhaps additional ships from a battlegroup. 
Command and control issues pose another concern. Ifthe Arsenal Ship does 
incorporate the CEC which eventually expands to permit targeting by an array of forces, 
this structure could become disorganized. The potential for trouble associated with dual 
tasking is disturbing unless a specific command and control blueprint is established. 
4. Mission 
The Arsenal Ship is intended to operate forward in a manner which provides 
peacetime presence and crisis response in the event of a regional conflict. With massive 
firepower, Navy planners hope to create the ability to halt a regional aggressor quickly, 
allowing time for a counter-build up of friendly forces. The Arsenal Ship will attempt to 
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exploit technology through the integration of PGMs and the CEC, enhancing distribution 
of targeting data among theater assets. Additionally, it is intended to provide resources to 
meet required tasks through the diversity of weapons which it is proposed to carry. 
These capabilities suggest the Arsenal Ship could provide the Navy with an 
effective means of affecting events on land and contributing to the joint concept of "full-
spectrum dominance." 
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